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Should non-invasiveness change informed consent procedures for 
prenatal diagnosis? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that some health professionals believe consent 
procedures for the emerging technology of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis 
(NIPD) should become less rigorous than those currently used for invasive 
prenatal testing. In this paper, we consider the importance of informed 
consent and informed choice procedures for protecting autonomy in those 
prenatal tests which will give rise to a definitive result. We consider whether 
there is anything special about NIPD that could sanction a change to 
consent procedures for prenatal diagnosis or otherwise render informed 
decision-making less important. We accept the claim that the absence of 
risk of miscarriage to some extent lessens the gravity of the decision to test 
compared with invasive methods of testing. However, we also claim that the 
definitive nature of the information received, and the fact that the information 
can lead to decisions of great significance, makes NIPD an important 
choice. This choice should only be made by means of a rigorous and 
appropriately supported decision-making process (assuming that this is 
what the pregnant woman wants). We conclude that, on balance, consent 
procedures for NIPD should mirror those for invasive testing, albeit without 
the need to emphasise procedure-related risk. 
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Abbreviations:  
NIPD (non-invasive prenatal diagnosis) 
CVS (chorionic villus sampling) 
RAPID (Reliable, Accurate, Non-invasive, Prenatal Diagnosis) 
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Should non-invasiveness change informed consent procedures for 
prenatal diagnosis? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Currently, pregnant women in the UK are offered a number of antenatal or 
prenatal tests, results of which will vary from probabilistic to definite. Of 
these tests, those that can give a woman or couple a definitive result (that 
is, virtual certainty about the presence or absence of a particular fetal 
abnormality)1 are currently invasive and therefore carry a small but 
significant risk of miscarriage. However there is a new technology emerging, 
non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD), which would allow women to obtain 
definitive information about their fetus without the risk of miscarriage. [20 
The introduction of NIPD could, if made widely available, ultimately bypass 
invasive testing in pregnancy. Recent empirical evidence has suggested 
that healthcare professionals regard ‘informed decision-making’ for NIPD as 
less important than for invasive testing. [17] In light of this finding, this paper 
explores the decision-making procedures that ought to accompany NIPD 
and claims that NIPD should not reduce the emphasis on the gravity of the 
information that could arise from this testing. 
 
One of the key principles behind prenatal testing is that women are entitled 
to exercise reproductive autonomy. Informed choice and informed consent 
procedures are usually considered to protect this. [3] Obtaining informed 
consent or promoting informed choice for diagnostic tests or screening in 
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pregnancy is well accepted as standard professional practice and is 
reflected in guidance in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. [9, 14] 
Professional deliberations on this topic are less about the appropriateness 
of women giving consent per se; instead the focus is on how to ensure 
consent and choice are genuine and well-informed. Given there is evidence 
to suggest that informed decision-making procedures may be threatened by 
the introduction of the new technology of NIPD [17] and given the wider 
ethical context of this emerging technology, [1, 2,10] it is timely to critically 
review the value of informed decision-making in prenatal testing and how 
this should impact decision-making procedures for NIPD. 
 
In this paper, we argue that the introduction of NIPD should not radically 
change informed decision-making procedures for definitive prenatal testing. 
We first briefly describe NIPD and discuss the concepts of informed choice 
and informed consent. After a brief description of a recent empirical study, 
we then consider whether there is anything about non-invasive diagnosis 
that means autonomy should play a lesser role, one that would justify an 
erosion of, or change to, informed decision-making procedures for prenatal 
diagnosis. To do this we consider the significance of the absence of risk to 
the pregnancy that is a feature of NIPD. We also discuss the differences 
between a decision to test, and the decisions following receipt of results. 
Included in this discussion is the consideration that the nature of definitive 
information may have a bearing on a woman’s decision whether to undergo 
NIPD. We also consider the implications of offering NIPD on a ‘routine’ 
basis in pregnancy before very briefly considering the policy context. 
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We claim that the absence of risk in NIPD is a justifiable motivation for a 
modification to informed decision-making procedures for prenatal diagnosis, 
in that less time will need to be spent discussing procedure-related risk. 
However any policy about informed decision-making for NIPD must take 
account of the definitive nature of the information, the potential impact of the 
knowledge, and of any action resulting from that knowledge, as these 
features of NIPD are more akin to prenatal diagnosis than screening (which 
only provides a risk-based and not a definitive result). This makes decisions 
about whether to undergo NIPD potentially very important. We conclude that 
informed decision-making procedures for NIPD do not necessarily need to 
be as stringent as those for invasive testing methods, particularly if NIPD is 
to be offered to all pregnant women (as a policy of stringent informed 
decision-making would have significant resource implications for pre-test 
counselling). We claim, though, that informed decision-making should be 
subject to more thorough procedures than non-invasive screening tests, as 
these provide only probabilistic results.  
 
 
1. CONTEXT OF NIPD AND INFORMED DECISION-MAKING 
 
(a) Clinical Background to NIPD 
A pregnant woman seeking to discover information about the health of her 
fetus can currently consider several options for prenatal screening or 
diagnosis. These can be either invasive or non-invasive and will provide a 
range of information about the health of the fetus. Existing non-invasive 
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technologies that do not pose a risk to the pregnancy include blood tests to 
measure levels of certain biochemical markers, or first-trimester ultrasound 
to assess a risk of Down’s syndrome. These are routinely offered to 
pregnant women as part of antenatal screening programmes.2 However, 
NIPD departs from these technologies in that a biochemical test early in 
pregnancy provides only a probabilistic or risk-based result and ultrasound 
may provide information that has uncertain diagnostic significance.3 Under 
existing practice, more definitive information about the health of the fetus 
can be obtained using amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling (CVS), but 
these are invasive and carry a small but significant risk of miscarriage.  
 
The necessity of risking a pregnancy to obtain a definitive diagnosis about 
the health of a fetus may soon be removed. Recent advances have given 
rise to non-invasive testing methods, which can detect cell free fetal DNA 
(ffDNA) in maternal blood via a blood test. [6] ffDNA is derived from 
placental cells and crosses over into the maternal bloodstream, circulating 
as small fragments. These DNA fragments, reliably detected from around 
seven weeks’ gestation, comprise only a small proportion of the overall cell-
free DNA (cfDNA) in the maternal bloodstream and are not currently 
distinguishable from maternal DNA. NIPD therefore detects gene changes 
not present in the mother, such as fragments of Y chromosome DNA or 
paternally-inherited gene changes. ffDNA is rapidly cleared from the 
maternal bloodstream within hours of delivery, making it feasible for use 
regardless of whether a woman has been pregnant previously. Accurate 
prenatal diagnosis using NIPD has already been reported for conditions 
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such as achondroplasia (short stature), cystic fibrosis and x-linked 
conditions. [19] As techniques that make use of measurements of molecular 
weight improve, NIPD may also become possible for chromosomal 
conditions such as Down’s syndrome. Additional non-medical applications 
are also emerging, including commercial prenatal gender and paternity 
testing. If its reliability is proven, the main advantages of NIPD will be that: it 
can be undertaken earlier in pregnancy (perhaps before significant 
maternal-fetal bonding has occurred, and where medical termination may 
still be possible); and that it is safer than invasive diagnosis. It is essential to 
appreciate that NIPD would provide information of similar diagnostic power 
as amniocentesis or CVS, but without the procedure-related risk.  
 
As and when NIPD becomes available, it will have implications for 
reproductive and public health policies, for example whether it should be 
used to replace existing screening tests with a diagnostic procedure, 
whether it will become a new intermediary step between screening and 
invasive testing or whether it will replace invasive testing altogether.4 
Notwithstanding established professional practices and legal obligations, we 
might expect the process of NIPD to incorporate a procedure of informed 
consent or informed choice, particularly given that one of the key 
motivations for prenatal testing is to allow women to exercise autonomy. In 
the context of NIPD, exercising autonomy may manifest itself in a number of 
ways, for example in choosing whether to continue a pregnancy when a 
fetus has an abnormality and thus planning to care for a child with a 
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disability or in choosing appropriate options for labour (as is beneficial when 
a fetus has haemophilia).  
 
(b) Informed Decision Making 
For the purposes of this paper, we have assumed that reproductive 
decision-making is of moral importance. There are four reasons why 
prenatal informed decision-making is usually valued. First, informed 
decision-making is instrumental to promoting best interests. Women are 
usually in a privileged position of knowing their best interests and arguably 
what is best for their possible future children. Making an informed decision 
in prenatal testing can lead to better outcomes, such as satisfaction with the 
decision made. [7] Second, a well-designed informed decision-making 
procedure can protect women from being deceived or coerced. [12] Third, 
such procedures exercise respect for autonomy and autonomy is 
intrinsically valuable. Finally, and more pragmatically, informed decision-
making can also protect health professionals from complaints and litigation. 
[11, 13] 
   
In medical ethics, we tend to describe the process of prior deliberation and 
agreement to any health intervention as ‘informed consent’. In health 
psychology the terms ‘informed choice’ and ‘informed decision-making’ are 
also used, and these are prominent in literature about prenatal diagnosis 
and NIPD. For clarity, we will briefly describe the terms ‘informed choice’ 
and ‘informed consent’ and their overlap.5 
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Informed choice and informed consent are both intended to enable 
individuals to make informed decisions, with the implicit common feature 
that this is in line with what that individual wants. Informed consent is 
agreement by the patient under conditions that the patient has capacity, is 
appropriately informed and makes a voluntary decision. An informed choice 
is one that is based on relevant knowledge, is consistent with the decision-
maker’s values and is behaviourally implemented (enacted). [7] As Marteau 
explains, informed choice and informed consent differ “in two important 
ways. First, informed consent is not explicitly concerned with the 
understanding of those not consenting”. [8, first emphasis added] 
“Second,… [informed consent] is not explicitly concerned with the 
consenting individual’s values.” [8] 
 
While incorporating an individual’s values into the notion of informed 
decision-making has some problems, for example individuals’ changing and 
conflicting values, [8] both choice and consent imply respect for (and 
protection of) individual autonomy. In this paper we focus on this common 
attribute. There are procedural and conceptual differences between 
informed choice and informed consent, but these do not affect the present 
discussion. We are interested in how to adequately protect autonomy in 
NIPD using informed decision-making procedures and so use the term 
‘informed decision-making’ to refer to both informed consent and informed 
choice. The broad conclusion of this paper will therefore apply to both 
concepts and the conclusions should be meaningful in both bioethics and 
health psychology. In the following section we will explore possible reasons 
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why the informed decision-making procedure for NIPD may be less rigorous 
than for current invasive prenatal testing. 
 
2. HEALTH PROFESSIONALS’ VIEWS, RISK ELIMINATION AND 
ROUTINISATION 
 
a) Health professionals’ views of informed decision-making for NIPD 
Recent empirical research suggests that, if left unchecked, development of 
NIPD could lead to an erosion of informed decision-making. [17] Results of 
a vignette-based survey of 231 UK obstetricians and midwives indicate that 
this group of professionals believe that there would be less need for formal 
written consent to NIPD for Down’s syndrome (assuming this were 
available), when compared with invasive prenatal diagnosis. Additionally, 
respondents believed that the offer and uptake of the test need not take 
place on a different day, creating a ‘one-step’ procedure. This would be 
contrary to current practice, in which amniocentesis or CVS is carried out on 
a different, later day to the initial screening blood test. Any move to this one-
step diagnostic procedure would mean only one point of contact between 
the woman and the healthcare professional, which raises concerns about 
‘neglecting’ autonomy [16] in the sense that the simplicity and speed of the 
procedure may be favoured over giving women adequate time for reflection, 
deliberation, and seeking further information if required.  
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b) Would the removal of risk sanction an erosion of informed decision-
making procedures for NIPD? 
The risks and harms associated with a blood draw necessary for NIPD are 
minimal, and so the prenatal testing process may now be thought of as 
technically less problematic and less risky when compared with invasive 
testing. Studies have shown that decliners of screening sometimes cite the 
risk of a follow-up test as their reason not to undergo screening. [4] It may 
be that the clinicians who participated in the study focused on procedure-
related risk as the predominant justification for formal written consent and a 
policy of separate appointments for offer and uptake of invasive testing 
[personal communication with Lyn Chitty]. Certainly, this would be a 
plausible argument in favour of less rigorous decision-making procedures 
for NIPD. This attitude would also echo a previous observation from a 
screening context, in which the relative lack of procedure-related risk 
impacts the requirement for women to be given full information and time to 
reflect. [13] It may also be worth noting that the absence of risk of 
miscarriage would reduce the scope for healthcare professionals being 
accused of negligence (i.e. inadequate information that leads to 
miscarriage). [13] 
 
There may also be an assumption that certainty and information about the 
genetic status of the fetus are fundamentally good. If so, it may be that the 
only essential information for women considering the test is that they will 
receive a definitive answer without risk to their pregnancy. However, it is not 
necessarily the case that definitive information is always perceived as a 
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good thing. The definitive nature of the NIPD results may have significant 
bearing on how a woman perceives her situation and how she wishes to 
proceed through the remainder of her pregnancy. A probabilistic result 
would offer some information by providing an indication of the likelihood of 
the fetus having certain conditions, but would still leave open the possibility 
that the fetus did not have those conditions. While one woman may undergo 
further tests to resolve this uncertainty, another woman (particularly one 
who would not terminate a pregnancy for reasons of congenital abnormality) 
may not want to know for certain the status of her fetus. She may prefer to 
remain in a state of hope that her child will not have a particular condition 
rather than continue a pregnancy with the certainty that the child will. This 
attitude may prevail even if a no-risk test is available.  
 
Given that information derived from NIPD will be definitive, it may, 
depending on how NIPD is implemented, remove the opportunity for women 
to make their next decision (to proceed to definitive testing, or continue the 
pregnancy taking on board the probabilistic information received) without 
knowing the exact status of the fetus. That is, women will be making their 
decision based on much greater certainty as opposed to the probabilistic 
result from a screening blood test. This may be problematic, as we have 
already noted. Further, post-test decisions (whether to continue the 
pregnancy or not) based on certainty are arguably of a different type to 
those based on probability and this could fundamentally affect a woman’s 
subsequent experience of her pregnancy. The information a woman 
receives can be extremely important, and might have a significant impact on 
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the way she perceives her fetus and pregnancy. For these reasons, women 
should have sufficient time to decide whether they wish to have definite 
knowledge. This in itself has implications for informed decision-making, as 
over-emphasising a lack of procedure-related risk may mean that women 
under-appreciate the certainty that will be forthcoming, and the lost 
opportunity to accept uncertainty highlighted above. 
 
To consider NIPD as akin to a blood test rather than amniocentesis or CVS 
would therefore be to regard the avoidance of a risk of miscarriage as the 
only morally significant dimension to the decision whether to test.6 When a 
woman chooses to undergo NIPD, she is participating in a decision to be 
informed about the genetic status of her fetus. While one woman may use 
the diagnosis to prepare for having a child with a disability, or to manage her 
pregnancy and delivery, another woman may terminate the pregnancy on 
the basis of the information she receives.7 Unlike current non-invasive 
methods, the test result will be definitive, which, for those who undergo the 
test, will remove the option of ‘leaving it to chance’ whether they bear a child 
with a disability.  
 
A key aspect to our position is that it is important, psychologically, that 
women are given time for reflection on whether to undergo testing. It has 
also been suggested by Scully at al that the time taken to deliberate allows 
individuals to exercise their moral agency. [15] They claim that an individual 
facing decisions about genetic testing may ‘slice up’ their decision making to 
“preserve a cognitive and affective space within which he or she can 
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continue to perceive the situation sensitively and accurately, and recognise 
his or her moral responsibilities within it.” [15, p216] It is therefore important 
that there is appropriate time for reflection, to allow women the ‘space’ to 
come to their decision.  
 
One possible objection to this cautious approach is that the purpose of the 
test is merely to gather information, which is not of itself a moral decision. 
The objection may be that the morally significant decision would be what 
action, if any, is then taken on the basis of that information. However, we 
maintain that the decision whether to receive this kind of information in the 
first place is a moral one. If a woman chose not to receive this information, 
she would be taking some responsibility for the possibility of bearing a child 
with a disability. Also, for those women who would consider terminating the 
pregnancy on the grounds of disability, choosing to receive the information 
may be to act on the principle that the status of the fetus may have a 
bearing on whether they would terminate. We claim that on these grounds, 
the decision whether to receive the information is itself morally relevant. If 
the decision whether to undergo NIPD is made on the same day as it is 
offered, some women may find themselves making only a nominal choice 
about a morally-relevant and non-trivial matter. 
 
c) Routinisation 
Having argued that women should be given sufficient time and information 
to decide whether to receive definitive information about their pregnancy, 
and that the decision to receive information is a moral one, we have 
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established that removal of risk of miscarriage is not the only significant 
change NIPD would bring to prenatal testing.  
 
We will now briefly consider the possible impact of ‘routinisation’ of prenatal 
testing via NIPD.  
 
Three relevant aspects of this debate are: (i) the effect of the timing of the 
process; (ii) whether women may feel there is an expectation to have the 
test; and (iii) whether lessening the formal decision-making process may be 
to underplay the importance of the decision. 
 
It may be suggested that the risk-free and relatively simple process of NIPD 
may encourage ‘routinisation’, that is a standard offer and uptake of this test 
by most pregnant women. While routinisation can increase efficiency and 
improve uptake, it could also potentially undermine the decision-making 
process. For example, routinisation may further encourage a one-step 
process in which women may not have sufficient time for deliberation and 
information gathering.  
 
Second, routinisation may also give rise to an expectation that women will 
undergo NIPD, as has already been suggested in the context of NIPD [2] 
and screening. [13, 18] If this was the case, then routinisation may not 
reflect an appropriately informed decision. Women would need time for 
reflection to make a well-informed and considered decision that took 
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account of all of their values, not just those relevant to the risks associated 
with the procedure.  
 
Third, same-day testing and the removal of written consent may de-
emphasise the importance of the decision whether to undergo the test. 
While NIPD is risk-free and clinically preferable, these features do little to 
lessen the moral significance of the choice to receive the information. 
Wrapped up in the choice over whether to undergo NIPD may be values 
regarding disability, termination, and practical considerations about the 
family dynamic and whether one is adequately prepared to care for a child 
with a particular medical condition.  
 
 
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
 
So far the discussion has not included any particular presumptions as to the 
model of NIPD that may be introduced into clinical practice. We have, 
however, focused our discussion on diagnostic testing for all pregnant 
women. We intend that our recommendations for an intermediary type of 
decision-making procedure should apply to all NIPD, whatever the model of 
service delivery that is eventually adopted.  Yet we also recognise that while 
ideally every woman would be given full information, counselling where 
appropriate, and sufficient time for deliberation, there are resource 
limitations to achieving such standards. There would be an enormous 
challenge to resources if NIPD were to become routinely offered to every 
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pregnant woman were our requirement for comprehensive counselling 
adhered to. But at the very least, we assert that pre-NIPD counselling and 
information provision should include providing information about the test 
when women first book in for antenatal care and then a verbal discussion at 
the first antenatal appointment, before blood is taken at a later appointment. 
However, a more comprehensive discussion of the exact mode of informed 
decision-making is currently limited as we do not yet know exactly which 
model of service delivery for NIPD will be implemented. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Initial evidence has suggested that health professionals believe the process 
of pre-test decision-making could change between invasive prenatal 
diagnosis and NIPD. [17] Pre-test counselling and information provision for 
invasive testing concentrates, justifiably, on two important aspects: the 
procedure-related risk of the test and the possible outcome of the test. NIPD 
will remove the need to discuss procedure-related risk, however it will not 
alter the information women will receive: that is whether or not a fetus is 
affected with a particular genetic condition. If decision-making processes for 
NIPD fail to reflect this, women may, given the non-invasive nature of this 
test, fail to appreciate the potential significance of the information they may 
receive. 
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The procedures relating to informed choice and informed consent for NIPD 
ought to reflect the importance of autonomous reproductive choice. The 
clinical simplicity of NIPD, and the fact that it carries no risk to the 
pregnancy, are good reasons in favour of having straight-forward formal 
procedures for decision-making. However, we have argued in this paper 
that the procedure should not be changed radically from existing practice for 
invasive diagnostic testing. This will require appropriate commitment of 
resources for pre-test information provision and discussion. This is because, 
we have claimed, the diagnostic nature of the results may put a pregnant 
woman in a very different position than probabilistic results would. Further, 
the results she receives may lead to an important decision of great moral 
and emotional magnitude. We also claimed that information is not always 
necessarily a good, and that some women may (entirely reasonably) prefer 
not to know the genetic status of their fetus.  
 
It is not yet known exactly how (and if) NIPD will be introduced into clinical 
practice. But however it is offered, the formal decision-making procedure is 
likely to be slightly different to those for existing methods. We hope to have 
shown in this paper that while the removal of risk from diagnostic prenatal 
testing would have a significant positive impact on reproductive choice, 
there are other important moral considerations that mean the choice 
whether to undergo NIPD may not be simpler than the choice whether to 
undergo other non-invasive screening tests during pregnancy. 
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The challenge is now to translate this debate into a set of practical and 
relevant recommendations for the introduction of NIPD into clinical practice, 
taking account of existing arrangements for antenatal care and resource 
limitations. This will necessitate working with health professionals, recipients 
of NIPD and relevant policy-makers to produce sound information and 
resources for wide implementation. 
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NOTES 
 
1. As ffDNA is derived from the placenta, there is a small chance that the 
genetic information in the maternal bloodstream may not be exactly 
representative of the foetus 
2. We recognise that the ‘routinisation’ of screening and testing in 
pregnancy is ethically contentious and has been debated in the ethics 
literature [5]. However, a substantive consideration of the nuances of the 
debate over routinisation is beyond the central scope of this paper. 
3. For example, a measure of the thickness of the nuchal fold (the 
thickness on the back of the fetus’ neck) that lies on the 99th percentile of 
the normal distribution may have no clinical significance, but it may also 
indicate a risk of Down Syndrome.   
4. Policy on how NIPD is to be offered to pregnant women is not yet 
determined and is the subject of an ongoing UK national research 
programme (RAPID:  http://www.rapid.nhs.uk). NIPD could be offered to 
(i) replace antenatal screening programmes with a ‘one stop’ definitive 
indication of risk; (ii) as an intermediary step between antenatal 
screening and invasive diagnosis; or (iii) as a follow-up to antenatal 
screening instead of invasive prenatal diagnosis; in the same way that 
amniocentesis is offered now. Which of (i) – (iii) is chosen will depend on 
the success rates for pilot studies of NIPD, financial implications and 
educational and counselling resources. A determination of the preferred 
model is therefore inappropriate at this stage and we do not adopt a 
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preferred model in this paper, although we briefly discuss policy 
implications in Section 3. 
5.  Further analysis and comparison of these terms has been undertaken 
elsewhere. [8] 
6. Decision-making on the basis of probability, or uncertainty, can be 
problematic for different reasons. Making a decision on the basis of 
uncertain information involves a risk analysis. It is possible, for example, 
that a woman could terminate her pregnancy on the basis of the 
probability that the fetus carries a certain genetic condition, only to find 
that in fact the fetus did not have that condition. Indeed, avoidance of 
such problems of uncertainty forms part of the appeal of NIPD. 
7. This will, of course, depend on the clinical utility and validity of this test, 
and women’s acceptance of its reliability. 
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